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A two-front attack 
to overcome the 
payments crisis of 
developing countries 
Fabio R. Fiallo* 
T h e developing countries' payment crisis has reached 
dramatic proportions, and cannot be overcome with-
out large-scale action compassing the two variables 
that determine payments capacity: the capacity to pos-
sess or create liquid assets and the capacity to generate 
foreign exchange income, especially by means of ex-
ternal trade. The measures proposed in the present 
article relate to the establishment of an international 
currency based on primary products, which could be 
administered by the International Monetary Fund, 
and to the adoption by the developing countries of a 
more persuasive strategy in negotiations on access to 
markets. To implement the measures in question the 
developing countries would need to assume an active 
role, inasmuch as they would have to turn their own 
natural resources and import markets to account, 
manipulating them as bases for negotiations. The pay-
ments problems of the developing countries are too 
acute to be resolved through mere international co-
operation commitments or through the adoption of 
world programmes, which by themselves will never 
improve the developing countries' bargaining power. 
This two-front attack would, however, improve the 
power of the developing countries to negotiate debt 
maturities and terms of payment and would also con-
siderably lighten the burden of the adjustment pro-
grammes which the said countries are adopting. 
*Staff member of the Secretariat of lhe United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAIJ). The views 
expressed in this paper, however, are the sole responsibility of 
the author and do not reflect those of the UNCTAD Secretariat. 
Introduction 
In 1981, the magnitude of total world debt was 
estimated to be equivalent to 1.4 times world GNP, 
exclusive of cent ra l ly-p lanned economies. 
Moreover, world GNP in nominal terms has been 
growing at an annual rate of 7%, whilst the an-
nual average rate of interest has been above 10%. 
This economic growth, therefore, has not been 
enough to cover interest payments. 
T h e situation is particularly grave for an in-
creasing number of developing countries. The 
outstanding external debt of net-debtor develop-
ing countries was estimated to have exceeded 
US$ 600 billion by the end of 1984, or 1.8 times 
their total export earnings dur ing that year 
(UNCTAD, 1984, table 11). The liabilities of de-
veloping countries have been aggravated further 
by the considerable appreciation of the United 
States dollar over the past few years, as a large 
part of the external debt of these countries is 
denominated in dollars. And while a timid fall in 
borrowing rates has taken place lately, such rates 
remain above both the rate of export growth of 
developing countries and the expected rates of 
re turn of most development projects. 
At the same time, net transfers of financial 
resources to developing countries have been de-
clining. Net flows of banking funds to non-OPEC 
developing countries dropped from US$ 31 bil-
lion in 1981 to US$ 15 billion in 1982 and to only 
US$ 2 billion in 1983; whilst interest payments 
made by these countries in 1983 amounted to 
US$ 15 billion. Gross borrowing of non-oil-
developing countries, exclusive of "managed" 
loans (i.e., loans extended in the context of debt 
rescheduling), aumounted to only US$ 9.7 bil-
lion in 1983 as compared to US$21.9 billion in 
1982. As a result, there was a net transfer from 
developing countries in their transactions with 
banks of about US$ 7 billion in 1982 and US$ 21 
billion in 1983 (UNCTAD, 1984, paragraphs 113, 
114 and 153). This pattern is likely to have per-
sisted during 1984 inasmuch as overall foreign 
lending by banks reporting to the Bank for In-
ternational Settlements slowed down consid-
erably during the first half of 1984, and declined by 
US$ 37 billion in the third quarter (Wall Street 
Journal and Financial Times, 19 February, 1985). 
Official flows too fell from US$ 61.4 billion in 
1980 to US$ 48.1 billion in 1983 (UNCTAD, 1985 
(a))-
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Multilateral institutions providing financial 
assistance to developing countries have been ex-
periencing growing difficulties in securing an 
adequate volume of resources. The IMF has not 
been able to proceed to a new allocation of Spe-
cial Drawing Rights because of lack of agreement 
on the part of major financial powers. A number 
of industrial countries have shown reluctance to 
expand their contributions to multilateral agen-
cies, as reflected in the recent failure to agree on 
an adequate replenishment of the International 
Development Association (IDA) and of the United 
Nations International Fund for Agricultural De-
velopment (IFAD), and in the refusal of some of 
these countries to join the Special Facility for 
Africa South of the Sahara which has been re-
cently established by the World Bank (UNCTAD 
(b), TD/B/AC. 17/25/Add. IA, paragraph A, 19). 
As their borrowing capacity attains critical 
limits, a growing number of developing coun-
tries have had to submit their economies to adjust-
ment programmes designed in accordance with 
the conditionality principle and the performance 
criteria of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). The adjustment programmes are intended 
to eliminate, or at least substantially reduce, bal-
ance-of-payments deficits, in particular by 
means of exchange rate depreciation and of aus-
terity measures. The social and political cost of 
such programmes is very high, as they impinge 
heavily upon the living conditions of the popula-
tion in the countries concerned. But im-
plementation of these programmes by debtor 
countries has become a sine qua non requirement 
for the renegotiation of their debt and for secur-
ing further credits from lending banks and gov-
ernments. On the other hand, the programmes 
do not provide for complementary action to be 
taken by developed countries with a view to 
reactivating sluggish demand for imports and 
arresting protectionist trends, which are major 
causes of developing countries' losses of export 
earnings. The burden of adjustment thereby 
falls upon the shoulders of debtor developing 
countries alone. Moreover, the ajustment pro-
grammes tend to exacerbate cyclical trends for 
two different reasons. First, the programmes are 
imposed at times when countries face severe bal-
ance-of-payments difficulties, and these nor-
mally arise during periods of sluggish world de-
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mand. Secondly, they involve a reduction of the 
demand of debtor countries and, therefore, con-
tribute to a further decline in the levels of total 
world demand. 
Expectations have been nurtured on the pros-
pects for economic recovery in major industrial 
countries and on the ensuing expansion of the 
exports of developing countries. The average 
rate of growth of industrial countries did indeed 
reach 4.75% in 1984, the highest level since 1976 
and contrasting with 2.6% in 1983 (OECD, 1984). 
The volume of world trade increased by 9% in 
1984, and the export earnings of developing 
countries by 7.5% (GATT/1371). But OECD fore-
casts point to a slower growth again in industrial 
countries in 1985; and the IMF predicts an annual 
growth rate of only 3% in the world economy as a 
whole for the rest of the decade, a forecast which 
may even turn out to be over-optimistic (OECD, 
1984 and Financial Times, 17 April 1985). The 
menace of protectionism is thus likely to gain 
renewed strength. The tendency is towards con-
tinuing aggravation of the payments position of 
the developing world. 
The payments capacity of any country is es-
sentially determined by three variables, namely: 
the capacity to create liquid assets of in-
ternational acceptability; the capacity to generate 
foreign exchange, notably through earnings 
from foreign trade ; and the capacity to borrow in 
international markets, which is in turn a function 
of the first two variables. The gravity of the debt 
problem of the developing countries and the 
ensuing need for immediate financial relief have 
forced these countries to concentrate efforts 
upon the third, the dependent, variable. De-
veloping countries thus have had to divert their 
attention from the two key and independent de-
terminants of payments capacity. But action with 
regard to borrowing capacity alone can at best 
postpone for some time the showdown, the mo-
ment at which the two key issues will have to be 
seriously tackled. International concern will 
therefore have to be reoriented towards finding 
ways of enabling developing countries to partici-
pate effectively in the creation of international 
liquidity and of expanding their export earnings. 
This paper attempts to identify the major issues 
at stake as well as the possible elements of a 
meaningful, effective international line of action. 
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The two key determinants of the payments capacity 
1. Creation and distribution 
of international liquidity 
T h r o u g h o u t the whole postwar period, the 
volume of international liquidity has been de-
termined by a handful of countries and in par-
ticular by the United States. No development has 
made any real difference to the concentration of 
the power to create international liquidity. The 
establishment of the markets for Eurocurrencies 
and petrodollars has not undermined this con-
cent ra t ion; by controll ing the conventional 
money supply, key-currency countries can con-
trol the world supply of their currencies (Lindert-
and Kindleberger, 1982). A new multinational 
asset has seen the light of day: the Special Draw-
ing Rights (SDRS) issued by the International 
Monetary Fund. But the SDRS represent a trivial 
proportion of world liquid assets. They are mere-
ly a reserve asset, and have not thus far been 
utilized on a significant scale as a vehicle of non-
official transactions. Even as a reserve asset, SDRS 
only represent 5% of total official reserves. 
Moreover, the level and the international dis-
tribution of SDRS are decided in accordance with 
the Fund's quota system and are therefore con-
trolled by the same few traditional financial pow-
ers. 
T h e concentration of world liquidity power 
is reflected to a certain extent in the inadequate 
growth of the volume of official reserves and in 
their uneven distribution amongst countries. Re-
serves have not grown at the same pace as in-
ternational trade transactions. It is true that re-
serves are needed not so much to finance trade 
transactions as to finance deficits. The evolution 
of the reserve-import ratio, however, is normally 
used as a proxy for purposes of measuring the 
adequacy of the magnitude of liquid funds, in-
asmuch as deficits have actually expanded at least 
as fast as overall trade transactions. The ratio of 
world reserves to imports has decreased steadily 
from 85% in 1950 to less than 25% at the present 
time. World official reserves in 1953-1954 were 
equivalent to 37 weeks of imports, but they rep-
resented no more than 11 weeks of imports in 
1982. Moreover, reserves have remained un-
evenly distr ibuted. T h e share of industrial 
countries in world reserves in accounting values 
dropped from 77% in 1951 to 58% in 1982 (IMF, 
1984). But the actual share of such countries is 
likely to have remained much the same as in the 
1950s; industrial countries hold the bulk (around 
90%) of official gold reserves, and the accounting 
value of such reserves is calculated in terms of 
prices which are far below prevailing world mar-
ket quotations. If the value of gold reserves were 
estimated in terms of world market prices, it 
would then appear that industrial countries have 
probably kept their share in world reserves 
approximate ly constant even though other 
countries have meanwhile significantly increased 
the weight they carry in international trans-
actions and/or are experiencing acute liquidity 
needs resulting from their heavy debt burden. 
T h e gap between reserve holders and reserve 
seekers is therefore likely to have expanded con-
siderably. 
T h e flow and magnitude of international 
liquidity is thus chiefly dependent upon the 
monetary and related policies of a few developed 
countries. The level of supply of the major vehi-
cle currencies naturally responds to the national 
concerns of the reserve-currency countries 
rather than to the objective of meeting the world 
d e m a n d for international liquid assets. Dis-
crepancies can, therefore, easily airse between 
the growth rates of supply of and demand for 
liquidity. What is questionable in this regard is 
not that reserve-currency countries formulate 
their monetary and trade policies according to 
their own national needs and priorities. Every 
country has or should have the sovereign right to 
establish its own policy objectives and to pursue 
them by applying policy measures of its own 
choice. T h e problem arises rather from the fact 
that the present international monetary system 
does not contain a built-in mechanism whereby 
the market for international liquid assets tends 
towards equilibrium. 
D u r i n g the ear ly postwar pe r iod , the 
mechanisms of liquidity creation fulfilled their 
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function reasonably well, inasmuch as the United 
States was willing to maintain a balance-of-
payments deficit and the world was in turn will-
ing to absorb dollars as a means of enhancing war 
recovery and economic growth. Discrepancies in 
the liquidity market were thus attenuated by 
world trade flows. Subsequently, discrepancies 
between supply of and demand for international 
liquidity changed their sign: the supply of dollars 
continued to grow at a relatively fast pace as a 
result of persistent deficits in the United States 
balance of payments and of the proliferation of 
Eurodol lar transactions. Countries were 
accumulating more dollars than they wanted. 
From the dollar shortage of the 1950s, the world 
economy moved in the late 1960s into what could 
be described as a dollar glut. The new situation 
led to the devaluation of the dollar in 1971 and to 
the establishment of the flexible exchange rate 
system in 1973. During the 1970s, two major 
events momentarily restored confidence in the 
international monetary mechanism and diluted 
concern over the possibility of persistent and 
dangerous gaps between supply and demand in 
respect of international liquid assets. These two 
events related to the ability of private banks to 
ensure the recycling of petrodollars and to the 
relatively stable operation of the new, flexible 
exchange-rate system. 
The concentration of power and the uneven 
distribution of international liquidity has been 
accentuated considerably during the past fifteen 
years by the macroeconomic policies of key-
currency countries as well as by the lending 
strategies of the major banks. During the 1970s, 
the policies in question involved in many cases 
inflationary expansion of domestic aggregate de-
mand aimed at compensating for the de-
flationary effects of oil price increases. Petrodol-
lar recycling through private banking also prob-
ably helped to accelerate inflation; the flow of 
petrodollars brought about a liberal lending poli-
cy on the part of private banks which manifested 
itself, inter alia, in relatively low interest rates and 
high gearing-ratios. 
Because of their inflationary effects, the 
macroeconomic policies of key-currency coun-
tries during the 1970s and the recycling of petro-
dollars through private banks were tantamount 
to a re-transfer of real wealth away from develop-
ing countries, both oil- and non-oil-producing, 
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and towards the traditional financial powers. Oil-
producing developing countries had thus ex-
tracted from the soil and surrendered a non-
renewable resource in exchange for financial 
assets that were denominated in currencies de-
preciated by world inflation. The reserve assets 
of non-oil developing countries also depreciated 
for the same reasons. Some developing countries 
even engaged in sophisticated portfolio-
diversification policies, and they did so under the 
expensive guidance of private firms of con-
sultants from developed countries. Such eminent 
guidance, however, proved to be no hedge 
against the fall in the real value of their financial 
assets. Moreover, a large number of developing 
countries had to resort to international borrow-
ing to maintain normal import levels in an in-
flationary world. As their terms of trade si-
multaneously deteriorated, these countries had to 
commit a larger amount of domestic resources to 
meet their import bills and service their growing 
foreign debt. The payments crisis and the ensu-
ing demand for dollars in their turn reinforced 
the United States' privilege of running persistent 
balance-of-payments disequilibria, a privilege 
which had been under momentary strain during 
the time of the dollar glut. 
The misadventures that developing coun-
tries have experienced in terms of depreciation 
of their financial wealth via world inflation are 
largely related to the fact that these countries 
gave up the custody of their wealth to the tradi-
tional financial centres and, therefore, had no 
control over policies which directly affected the 
real value of that wealth. The increases in oil 
prices had indeed caused a substantial transfer of 
income to oil-producing countries. But these 
countries did not acquire a corresponding say in 
the creation of international liquidity. Apart 
from some increase in their IMF quota and some 
involvement in international banking, no more 
was made at that time to develop mechanisms 
whereby oil-producing countries could take a 
share in decision-making with respect to the crea-
tion of international liquidity. Whether or not 
these countries could or should have envisaged 
the establishment of alternative mechanisms of 
liquidity creation is now a matter of hypothetical 
history. The fact is that the power to create in-
ternational liquidity was not significantly altered 
by the emergence of oil power and, furthermore, 
A TWO-FRONT ATTACK ON THE PAYMENTS CRISIS / Fabio R. Fiatlo 83 
that the financial wealth of developing countries 
has been diminishing steadily and is even pursu-
ing a negative trend. 
The macroeconomic policies of the major 
industrial nations have been appreciably mod-
ified in response to the economic recession of the 
early 1980s. The new policy mix consists in 
general of i) budgetary policies aimed at 
attenuating the tax burden of domestic firms and 
households and/or coping with the effects of ris-
ing unemployment; and ii) tightening monetary 
policies designed to reduce inflation rates. The 
policies adopted have certainly varied among de-
veloped countries, notably as regards their scale 
and the moment at which they were adopted. But 
their nature has been, all in all, similar, and they 
have conduced to unusually high interest rates. 
The debt burden of developing countries has 
been aggravated as a result. 
Of part icular importance for the in-
ternational liquidity market have been the im-
plications of the new policy mix of the United 
States. The French economist Paul Fabra has 
asserted that Chairman Volcker of the Federal 
Reserve Bank has accomplished a revolution in 
the world monetary system by de-linking the 
United States money supply from a target level 
of the interest rate: a revolution which, in his 
view, has had profounder consequences than the 
abandonment of the fixed exchange rate system 
in 1973 (Le Monde, 16 February 1985). 
Under the Federal Reserve Bank's new poli-
cy, the net capital outflow from the United States 
has considerably declined, while the foreign 
trade deficit has reached unprecedented levels. 
The main supplier of international liquidity is on 
the verge of becoming a net debtor. According to 
American Express, the United States' foreign 
debt (excluding direct foreign investment) will 
probably reach US$ 400 billion by the end of 
1985, or 126% of the country's export earnings 
(The Economist, 4 May 1985). 
A few figures will make it possible to ascer-
tain the magnitude of the phenomenon. The 
United States' balance on current account has 
moved from a surplus of US$ 6 billion in 1981 to 
a deficit of US$ 100 billion in 1984 (Karczmar, 
1985). Foreign capital inflows finance one-half of 
United States government borrowing (Financial 
Times, 2 January 1985). Gross purchases of 
United States long-term securities by foreigners 
increased from less than US$ 50 billion in 1978 
to US$ 224 billion in 1983 and nearly US$ 250 
billion in 1984 (The Economist, 2 January 1985). 
From a net lending position of US$ 45 billion in 
1982, United States banks became net borrowers 
in 1983 with a net deficit of US$ 24 billion (Wall 
Street Journal, 10 February 1985). At the same 
time, new United States investment and lending 
abroad dropped from US$ 107.8 billion in 1982 
to only US$ 43.3 billion in 1983, and may have 
plunged to US$ 1.8 billion in 1984 (Wall Street 
Journal, 25 February 1985). American banks 
have reportedly been borrowing from their for-
eign subsidiaries and lending the funds in the 
home market. In unprecedented fashion, an in-
creasing budget deficit in the United States is 
accompanied by more and more net borrowing 
on the part of United States corporations: a 
US$ 200 billion Unites States Government def-
icit plus a US$ 40 billion deficit of corporations 
in 1984 (Wall Street Journal, 10 February 1985). 
In January 1985, United States borrowers raised 
US$ 5.17 billion in the Euromarkets as com-
pared to only US$ 4.36 billion in the domestic 
market (Financial Times, 11 February 1985). All 
these figures mean that the amount of dollars 
available to the rest of the world is shrinking 
alarmingly, and this tendency imposes serious 
limitations upon the world's ability to pay dollar-
denominated debt and to conduct international 
trade transactions smoothly. 
The inadequate size of capital inflows into 
the world economy has thus far been com-
pensated to a certain extent by the expansion of 
world trade resulting from economic recovery in 
the North during the past two years, particularly 
in the United States, Japan and Canada. The 
slower growth expected in industrial countries in 
1985, however, will have adverse effects upon 
the volume of world trade due both to diminish-
ing world demand and to stronger protectionist 
pressures. Decreasing trade growth will in turn 
further aggravate the present world liquidity cri-
sis. But even if the decline in the flow of dollars to 
the rest of the world should come to a halt in the 
future, the payments difficulties of the develop-
ing countries are likely to remain at a critical 
level: such a halt would probably lead to interest 
rate increases as a means of recapturing the dol-
lars needed to finance the United States budget 
deficit. And higher interest rates would entail a 
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heavier debt services burden for the net-debtor 
developing countries. 
The time has therefore come to seriously 
consider alternatives to a monetary system based 
essentially on reserve currencies issued by 
national authorities in the light of their own con-
cerns, needs and Weltanschauunq. The mere fact 
that the traditional main supplier of in-
ternational liquidity is becoming a net debtor is 
perse a sufficient reason for exploring alternative 
mechanisms. In addition, the weight of in-
ternational trade in the world economy has dou-
bled during the past three decades and economic 
relations are far more pluralistic today than they 
used to be at the time of the Bretton Woods 
conference: in the new circumstances, the supply 
of international liquidity can hardly continue to 
rely essentially on flows of a few key national 
currencies. 
2. Foreign exchange earnings 
It is difficult to conceive that a stable solution to 
the current payments crisis can be found without 
securing significant improvements in the gains 
derived by developing countries from in-
ternational trade. The conditions which prevail 
at present in world trade relations do indeed set 
serious limits to the benefits that developing 
countries can derive therefrom. These con-
ditions relate in particular to sluggish world de-
mand, protectionism in developed countries, 
and adverse evolution of the terms of trade of 
developing countries. The countries in question 
have been actively pursuing the objective of im-
proved treatment in international trade rela-
tions. Efforts in this respect have multiplied, par-
ticularly since the 1960s, when a major diplomat-
ic offensive was launched by developing coun-
tries with a view to obtaining international 
recognition of the detrimental effects that pre-
vailing trade relations had upon their develop-
ment programmes and policies. The diplomatic 
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offensive brought about a number of positive 
results which include: the establishment of the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and De-
velopment ( UNCTAD) as a permanent organ of 
the General Assembly; the incorporation of Part 
iv into the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT), allowing Contracting Parties to 
grant non-reciprocal treatment to developing 
countries; the institution of the Generalized Sys-
tem of Preferences (GSP); and the negotiation of 
various international commodity agreements 
and of a Common Fund to Finance commodity 
buffer stocks and related measures. 
The above-mentioned results, however, 
have not been free from serious limitations. 
Notwithstanding the positive aspects of the GSP, 
the actual gains derived from the system have 
been very much reduced by the narrow product 
coverage of the national schemes of preferences 
as well as by a number of restrictive provisions 
concerning, in particular, safeguard measures, 
insufficient tariff cuts, and restrictive rules of 
origin. A large proportion of imports from de-
veloping countries thereby fall outside the GSP 
and hence do not benefit from it. The trade 
liberalization secured through GATT'S multi-
lateral trade negotiations has been more im-
portant for products of export interest to de-
veloped countries than for those exported by 
developing countries. Protectionist measures 
have been proliferating in many developed 
countries and they affect numerous products of 
export interest to developing countries. In-
dustrial policies in developed countries are often 
designed in such a way as to perpetuate in-
efficient industries competing with imports from 
developing countries rather than to facilitate the 
smooth transfer of resources away from such 
industries. As regards commodity agreements, 
major difficulties have arisen even in the 
renegotiation of agreements already existing. 
The Common Fund for commodities has not 
started operations as the minimun number of 
ratifications has not yet been secured. 
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II 
The present strategy of developing countries 
The difficulties that developing countries are 
encountering in regard to their payments capac-
ity appear to be largely related to the nature of 
the strategy followed by these countries in in-
ternational economic negotiations. A major revi-
sion of the negotiation styles has become an 
urgent necessity if the payments crisis of develop-
ing countries is to be overcome. This section con-
tains a discussion of the major limitations and 
shortcomings of the present strategy. 
1. Absence of major initiatives aimed at securing 
participation of developing countries 
in the creation of international liquidity 
Developing countries have systematically striven 
for a share in the world financial assets com-
mensurate with their economic weight and de-
velopment needs. Their efforts have certainly 
produced many positive results. As early as dur-
ing the Bretton Woods negotiations, it was the 
lobbying conducted by a number of developing 
countries which succeeded in placing the objec-
tive of development finance for the Third World 
on the same level of the World Bank's priorities 
as that of the recovery of war-torn industrial 
nations (Ackeson, 1969). 
It is also by the active diplomacy of develop-
ing countries that a number of facilities have 
been established in the International Monetary 
Fund with a view to increasing and smoothing 
the flow of financial resources available to de-
veloping countries. 
All these endeavours, however, are intended 
to alleviate the severe financial constraints which 
developing countries face rather than to reduce 
the concentration among a few industrial coun-
tries of the power to create and distribute in-
ternational liquidity. Some action has recently 
been taken within the framework of the IMF with 
a view to enlarging the share of developing 
countries in international liquid funds. This ac-
tion relates essentially to more ample participa-
tion of some developing countries, notably oil 
producers, in the Fund's quota system, and to the 
emission of Special Drawing Rights. But these 
measures have not significantly modified the 
concentration of the power to create in-
ternational liquidity. 
The lack of participation of developing 
countries in the creation and distribution of in-
ternational liquidity is largely responsible for the 
acrimoniousness of the relations that many ' 
developing countries maintain with the IMF. The 
Fund's conditionality principle and performance 
criteria have been under sharp and increasing 
criticism by developing countries, as they involve 
severe austerity programmes which undermine 
the standard of living of large sectors of the pop-
ulation of the countries concerned. There is in-
deed great scope for improvement of the 
aforesaid principle and criteria. The question of 
whether the burden of adjustment should fall 
upon debtor or upon creditor countries, or on 
both, is among the long-standing controversies in 
international economics and has been raised on 
several occasions ever since the Bretton Woods 
negotiations. It ought to be admitted, however, 
that balance-of-payments adjustment inevitably 
has to form part of any effective action aimed at 
correcting persistent deficits and at securing vi-
able economic growth. But the application of the 
Fund's conditionality principle is understand-
ably repugnant to debtor developing countries 
which have no meaningful say in the creation of 
international liquidity, while at the same time, 
they see that the richest key-currency nations can 
maintain enormous trade deficits without having 
to undergo any international sanction. Con-
ditionality principles would be more easily jus-
tified if debtor countries had a voice in decision-
making with respect to the creation and distribu-
tion of international liquidity. 
2. Insufficient persuasive power of 
the present strategy 
The strategy followed by developing countries in 
international negotiations on monetary, finan-
cial and commercial issues has essentially con-
sisted of pleas addressed to the international 
community in favour of action aimed at enhanc-
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ing their trade gains and at increasing the flows 
of financial resources towards them. The claims 
made to the international community have been 
grounded essentially on the benefits that the 
community as a whole is to derive from more 
equitable, expanded and stable economic rela-
tions. It has further been argued that economic 
recovery in the West could be accelerated by in-
creased demand from the Third World: an argu-
ment which calls both for bigger flows of finan-
cial resources and for better access to the de-
veloped markets. 
The incitements thus offered to gov-
ernments of developed countries, however, are 
not infrequently nullified by active counteracting 
pressures from groups and authorities in the de-
veloped countries themselves. These countries 
have their own priorities, their own conceptions 
and, most important, their own lobbies which in 
many cases exert pressures in favour of policies 
different from and even opposed to those re-
quested by developing countries. The argument 
for a transfer of resources towards developing 
countries, for instance, is countered by local lob-
bies on the grounds that an alternative transfer 
within the domestic economy could lower the 
prevailing unemployment rates. Strong pro-
tectionist pressures emanate in turn from local 
groups which are afraid of being jeopardized by 
increased import competition. Governments of 
developed countries can hardly meet the claims 
made by developing countries unless they receive 
more effective incentives to do so than they have 
thus far been given. 
The ability of any diplomatic strategy to 
achieve its objectives depends indeed upon its 
capacity to exercise bargaining leverage so as to 
mobilize national and international support. The 
power to create international liquidity has not 
been a gift received from heaven by any country. 
Such power has always been secured by the abil-
ity of reserve-currency countries to exercise the 
leverage given by their economic weight, to manip-
ulate successfully their monetary, Fiscal and 
commercial policies, and to persuade other 
countries of their capacity and readiness to hon-
our monetary and financial commitments. Mar-
ket access has in turn been secured principally by 
offering reciprocal concessions, or threatening 
removal of concessions, to other partners. Any 
trade liberalization is likely to be more significant 
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for products of interest to countries which pro-
vide concrete concessions than for products of 
interest to countries which request non-
reciprocal treatment, however just the cause of 
the latter may be. Developed countries normally 
resort to reciprocal concessions, and this be-
haviour can be regarded as a major reason why 
trade liberalization in multilateral trade negotia-
tions has concentrated on products of export 
interest to them. 
3. Excessive expectations from bilateral dealings 
in debt negotiations 
Any viable international institutional framework 
inevitably has to assign a place to bilateral as well 
as to multilateral dealings. These two forms of 
negotiation are actually complementary rather 
than alternative means of securing mutually ben-
eficial results. They are used in a com-
plementary manner, for instance, in the field of 
market access: major negotiations are regularly 
carried out within the framework of GATT, which 
is a multilateral institution, and they are often 
complemented by bilateral dealings between in-
dividual countries. 
But the negotiations on debt relief have not 
yet been placed in a similar broad framework. 
Creditor countries and institutions have invari-
ably advocated a bilateral, case-by-case approach. 
Developing countries, in their turn, would 
appear to prefer, or at least accept, the bilateral 
form in the hope of thereby securing better and 
more liberal relief conditions than if they had to 
share concessions with other debtor countries. 
But by acquiescing in bilateral dealings, debtor 
developing countries may be overlooking the 
leverage that this type of negotiation gives to 
their creditor partners. Before agreeing on debt 
relief in favour of a particular debtor country, 
such creditors will no doubt bear in mind the 
concessions that they have granted or are to 
grant to other debtor countries, even if the latter 
are not present at the negotiating table. As a 
token example, the United States was reportedly 
reluctant to agree on a multi-year government 
rescheduling package for Yugoslavia's debt on 
the basis that major debtors from Latin America 
might seek to avail themselves of the precedent 
{Financial Times, 7 January 1985). Within a pure-
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ly bilateral framework, therefore, creditors are in 
a particularly strong position, inasmuch as they 
can weigh and actually distribute concessions 
among debtor countries without having to face a 
co-ordinated stance on the latters' part. Certain-
ly, some co-ordination among debtor developing 
countries is secured, notably by the Group of 24 
in IMF and by agreements on common positions 
reached in regional organizations of the Third 
World. This co-ordination, however, consists in 
little more than the definition of guiding princi-
ples, and has not significantly altered either the 
bilateral nature or the outcome of international 
negotiations concerning debt relief. 
Ill 
The proposed two-front attack 
The preceding section was intented to dem-
onstrate the limitations and shortcomings of 
the strategy which developing countries at pres-
ent utilize in international negotiations related 
to payments problems. A new and more forceful 
strategy appears to be necessary for securing 
adequate levels both of financial flows and of 
foreign exchange earnings for developing 
countries. The new strategy would need to recast 
the priorities of developing countries in in-
ternational economic negotiations, and to re-
orient attention towards the two key de-
terminants of the payments capacity: the crea-
tion and allocation of international liquidity and 
the generation of foreign exchange earnings. To 
be effective, the strategy further ought to hold 
out enough inducements to persuade developed 
countries to share with developing countries the 
creation of international liquidity and to carry 
out adjustments in their own economies with a 
view to facilitating access to imports from develop-
ing countries of origin. To use the jargon of 
international politics, developing countries need 
to move from a debate to a game strategy. A 
debate strategy essentially aims at convincing the 
counterparts of the validity of one's own argu-
ments, at obtaining consensus, and this is pre-
cisely the nature of the present strategy. A game 
strategy, on the other hand, would seek to secure 
favourable behaviour on the partners' side by 
providing them with appropriate incentives and 
disincentives in the context of a bargaining pro-
cess (Frankel, 1973, and Rapoport, 1974). The 
capacity to provide such incentives and dis-
incentives is generally called bargaining lever-
age, and is determined both by the means at one's 
own disposal and by the ability to deploy and uti-
lize them effectively during the negotiation pro-
cess. 
A game strategy for developing countries 
appears to be not only necessary but also feasible. 
These countries do have bargaining leverage 
which stems from the importance of their natural 
resources and of their import markets. The 
American Geological Institute, for instance, has 
drawn attention to the strong dependence of the 
United States upon foreign supplies of a number 
of metals and minerals, some of which come 
from developing countries. Developing coun-
tries provide to countries members of the Eu-
ropean Economic Community (EEC) a large pro-
portion of the latter's imports of crucial raw 
materials: manganese (42%), copper (57%), 
phosphates (68%), tin (85%) and cobalt (92%) 
(Europe, 9 November 1977). Japan's dependence 
upon purchases of foreign raw materials is like-
wise a well-known fact. As regards the imports 
markets of developing countries, their signifi-
cance has been increasing over time, and today 
they represent an appreciable proportion of the 
total exports of developed countries. Developing 
countries purchase almost one-half of United 
States exports of manufactures and two-fifths of 
total EEC exports. It has been assessed that debt-
induced import cuts made by Latin American 
countries accounted for US$ 15 billion of the 
deterioration in the United States trade balance 
over 1982-1983 (Brown, 1984). 
lWashington Post Editorial reproduced in the In-
ternational Herald Tribune, 22 September 1980. 
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Of course, the bargaining leverage given to 
developing countries by their supplies of raw 
materials and by their import markets is not un-
bounded. A fresh example of its limits is to be 
found in the misadventures that the Organiza-
tion of Petroleum-Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
has been undergoing in attempting to preserve 
the real value of its foreign exchange earnings 
and of its financial wealth. It is true that the 
present difficulties of OPEC have probably arisen, 
not from any inherent insurmountable hand-
icap, but rather from two corrigible features of 
OPEC'S policy: i) the lack of counter-cyclical 
mechanisms to cope with the adverse effects of 
sluggish world demand (a matter which will be 
touched upon in the next section of this paper); 
and ii) a portfolio policy which actually gave up 
the control of the real value of OPEC'S financial 
assets to private Western banks and to the Cen-
tral Banks of the traditional reserve-currency 
countries. In any event, the aforementioned 
ca rds held by developing countries in the 
bargaining game could, if played effectively and 
tactfully, enable these countries to launch a ma-
j o r d i p l o m a t i c a t tack on the two key de-
terminants of the payments equation. The pos-
sible basic elements of the suggested diplomatic 
initiative are discussed below. 
1. Establishment of an international 
commodity currency 
T h e present world monetary system was es-
tablished at Bretton Woods in 1947 in accor-
dance with the necessities and with the in-
ternational balance of power prevailing in those 
times. T h e system, therefore, ought not to be 
regarded as an immutable framework. It has un-
dergone major transformations as new concerns 
have arisen and as the balance of power has 
evolved. T h e abandonment of the fixed ex-
change rate régime in 1973 constitutes an out-
standing example of the system's capacity to 
adapt itself to changing circumstances. It should 
indeed respond to a permanent quest for means 
of ensuring both monetary stability and adequate 
liquidity flows in an ever-changing world. The 
present payments crisis calls for a new major 
t r a n s f o r m a t i o n , notably in respect of the 
mechanisms of creation and distribution of in-
ternational liquidity. 
Developing countries do have the need and 
the means to play an active role in the mecha-
nisms of creation and distribution of international 
liquidity. They could in fact pledge and pool 
natural resources to create an international cur-
rency whose supply would be a function of the 
level of world demand for liquidity rather than, 
as is at present the case, contingent upon the 
policy priorities of reserve-currency countries 
and upon the IMF quota system. The commodity 
basket would comprise key raw materials and 
precious metals, and the number of such re-
sources should be large enough to prevent any 
new concentration of monetary power in the 
hands of a few commodity-producing countries. 
T h e commodity currency could be issued against 
liabilities denominated in terms of the natural 
resources committed. The value of the currency 
could in turn be expressed in coefficients of the 
reserve resources. All countries, both developing 
and developed, would be entitled to participate 
in the supply of the new currency by committing 
resources which they possess or can acquire 
through world market operations. Preferential 
pricing policies and swapping arrangements 
could further be instituted between developing 
reserve-commodity producing countries and 
other developing countries so as to facilitate the 
la t ters ' par t ic ipat ion in the creation of in-
ternational liquidity. 
No currency could, of course, be imposed 
upon the international community. It has to be 
willingly accepted by major partners. To ensure 
universal acceptability, the new currency would 
have to be managed in line with rigorous criteria 
by an international authority of established 
reputation such as the IMF. Management by the 
IMF would not, however, imply that decisions 
concerning the level and distribution of supply 
would be taken in accordance with the quota 
system. Precedents exist in international in-
stitutions of sub-groups of member States which 
have set up commissions or facilities without hav-
ing to surrender decision-making autonomy to 
the universal organs of the institutions con-
cerned. Such precedents include the group of 16 
developing countries set up under G A I T , which is 
charged with inst i tut ing special tariff pref-
erences among developing countries, and the 
IMF oil facilities, which were fed by a number of 
oil-producing countries of the Third World. De-
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cisions concerning the supply and distribution of 
the international currency, therefore, would be 
free from the limitations relating to the IMF quota 
system and would rather depend directly upon 
the willingness of participating countries to com-
mit their own resources so as to secure in-
ternational liquid funds. This autonomy vis-à-vis 
the IMF quota system would in itself constitute a 
major advantage as compared to the mechanisms 
of creation of SDRS. On the other hand, the coun-
tries involved would not have to surrender their 
natural resources but would be committed only 
to honour their resource-denominated liabilities. 
Their sovereignty over their natural resources, 
therefore, would not be impaired. The preserva-
tion of the national sovereignty would constitute 
a major advantage as compared to a proposal, 
which has been aired for some time, to convert 
the foreign debt of developing countries into 
equity shares in natural resources and in State 
enterprises (South, February 1984, p. 71; and 
Wall Street Journal, 1 April 1985). 
The idea of establishing an international 
commodity currency is not new. Its origins could 
be traced as far back as the late nineteenth cen-
tury, when the British economist Stanley Jevons 
put it forward for the first time. Suggestions of a 
similar nature were subsequently made on var-
ious occasions (Goudrian, 1942; Graham, 1944; 
and United Nations, 1953). 
A sound proposal in this regard was put for-
ward in 1964 at the first session of the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) by three eminent economists: A. Hart, 
N. Kaldor and the Nobel Prize-winner Jan Tin-
bergen (1964). At that time, the proposal did not 
receive the attention it deserved because in-
ternational concern was then oriented essentially 
towards t rade issues and because the in-
ternational monetary system had not yet been 
shaken by the onslaught of the events which have 
taken place since the late 1960s. Subsequently, 
with the abandonment of the gold exchange 
standard in 1971, attention was concentrated upon 
the workability of the floating exchange rate sys-
tem, notably in terms of its capacity to secure 
monetary stability. In fact, the central concern of 
the international community regarding mone-
tary matters during the 1970s was exchange-rate 
stability rather than adequate liquidity flows. 
However, with the growing risks of debt defaults 
and of world financial collapse, proposals for an 
international commodity currency deserve fresh 
consideration by the world community as a 
whole. 
It is not the purpose of this paper to endorse 
in toto the Hart-Kaldor-Tinbergen proposal. The 
conditions and problems of world monetary rela-
tions have changed dramatically since 1964. Kal-
dor himself made elaborations on the original 
proposal in articles written in the early 1970s 
(Kaldor, 1971, 1973 and 1974). 
The concrete modalities and characteristics 
of an international currency would have to be 
worked out by well-prepared negotiations taking 
full account of prevailing circumstances, needs 
and interests. But a number of considerations 
could be made beforehand, and these are dis-
cussed below. 
The establishment of the proposed currency 
should not be of an inflationary nature. The 
creation of an international currency must have a 
greater impact upon the distribution of liquidity 
than upon its magnitude. Inflationary effects 
would be produced if, and only if, the supply 
increase were to exceed the unmatched demand 
(Mundell, 1971). As mentioned before, the 
growth of reserve supply has substantially lagged 
behind the growth of international transactions. 
A recent study commissioned by the Institute for 
International Economics (Director, C. Fred Berg-
sten) calls for a new allocation of SDRS to meet 
present liquidity demand and argues that such an 
allocation would not have inflationary pressures 
as long as the growth of reserves were no greater 
than the corresponding demand (Williamson, 
1984). Actually, the issuance of the proposed 
currency would be even more neutral, in terms of 
inflationary effects, than the emission of SDRS. 
The latter are created and distributed among 
countries according to the IMF quota system 
(irrespective of whether such countries have 
liquidity shortages), whilst the currency would be 
issued only in the measure of the liquidity needs 
of purchasing countries. An emission of SDRS 
aimed at meeting liquidity needs would there-
fore involve a greater increase in world liquid 
funds than the issuance of the proposed curren-
cy. Moreover, the fact that the international cur-
rency would be supported by the reserve com-
modities would in itself be a means of preserving 
the real value of the currency in a world where 
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fiat money tends to depreciate as a result of infla-
tion. The currency could thus become a non-
depreciating asset in which financial wealth 
could be placed and protected from inflation-
induced erosion of its real value. 
A commodity currency could further have 
beneficial counter-cyclical effects. At times of 
sluggish world demand, deficit countries would 
be inclined to purchase the commodity currency 
from the IMF against liabilities denominated in 
terms of reserve resources. Countries would 
thereby be securing a volume of international 
liquidity which their foreign trade was momen-
tarily not providing. The commodity currency 
would accordingly enhance international 
purchasing power in times of recession. Con-
versely, these countries may be required to re-
purchase their resource-denominated liabilities as 
their export earnings re-establish their trend val-
ues. Export earnings would be higher during 
world economic booms, and the repurchase of 
resource-denominated Habilites would thus help 
to deflate the world economy, precisely at times 
when inflation may be needed or viable. The 
counter-cyclical effects of an international com-
modity currency have been admitted even by one 
of its critics, Milton Friedman (1951). And its 
counter-cyclical elements constitute a conspicuous 
merit if compared with the pro-cyclical effects of 
present adjustment programmes based upon 
conditionality clauses. The counter-cyclical 
potential of the commodity currency should not, 
however, foster a belief that the currency would 
constitute a disguised mechanism for the opera-
tion of commodity buffer stocks. The purpose of 
the currency would not be to stabilize commodity 
prices but rather to guarantee adequate liquidity 
flows. 
The proposal of an international commodity 
currency deserves particular attention in the 
light of recent moves in favour of a rehabilitation 
of gold in world monetary affairs and of the 
creation of new currencies for developed coun-
tries. The return to a gold standard was venti-
lated by the United States Administration a few 
years ago and has been supported in particular 
by some "supply-side" economists. It has not yet 
been considered formally, but neither is it buried 
{Wanniski, 1984 and 1985; and Anderson, 
1985). The gold standard, however, seems to be 
an inferior alternative to an international com-
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modity currency for a variety of reasons, such as: 
concentration of liquidity power among a few 
producers or holders of gold; inelasticity of the 
gold supply; and difficulties inherent in the 
maintenance of gold parities by national Central 
Banks. Such disadvantages do not arise in the 
case of an international (as compared to a nation-
al) currency supported by a basket of commodi-
ties rather than by gold alone. 
Two proposals have been put forward for 
the use of gold holdings in favour of developing 
countries. De Silva (1979) proposed the creation 
of a new currency unit which would be 100% 
supported by IMF gold holdings and would be 
aimed at promoting economic transactions with-
in the Third World. Brodsky and Sampson 
(1980 a) an b)) have in their turn suggested that 
the differential between the market value and 
the under-rated official value of world gold re-
serves (largely held by developed countries) 
should be distributed to all countries in accor-
dance with the IMF quota system: developing 
countries would receive a proportion of this dif-
ferential value and their liquidity position would 
thereby be strengthened. 
Whilst these two proposals reflect noble pro-
Third World sentiments, past experience in in-
ternational relations does not warrant envisaging 
that major holders of official gold would relin-
quish a significant portion of their financial wealth 
on the grounds of solidarity with poorer coun-
tries. As a matter of fact, a gold-backed "substitution 
account", aimed at channeling financial re-
sources towards developing countries, was con-
sidered in IMF in 1980 but failed to see the light of 
day because of the reluctance of major financial 
powers to sponsor it. The solution of the pay-
ments crisis of developing countries cannot come 
from hopes of solidarity action by the North but 
rather from skilful bargaining by the South. 
Other proposals have been recently put for-
ward by Richard Cooper (1984) for the creation 
of a new currency for industrial countries, and by 
M. Jacques Delors, President of the European 
Commission for an expanded role of the Eu-
ropean currency unit (ECU) as an official reserve 
currency among EEC countries (Financial Times 
and Wall Street Journal, 15 January 1985). The 
creation of a new currency for developed coun-
tries and/or a more important role for the ECU 
would improve the distribution of liquidity pow-
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er among such countries, but it would be in-
effectual as regards reducing the existing gap 
between those who create liquidity and the major 
debtor nations. 
2. A new strategy for the negotiation 
of market access 
The second part of the proposed diplomatic ini-
tiative relates to the negotiation of market ac-
cess. Developing countries are in a position to 
resort to a more forceful strategy in this regard. 
They could manipulate their import markets and 
their supplies of natural resources so as to secure 
more liberal access to the markets of developed 
countries. The conditions of access to developing 
countries' markets and to natural resources 
could be laid down in such a way as to accord 
individual developed countries differential treat-
ment depending upon whether, and to what ex-
tent, the latters' import markets were accessible 
to developing countries. Developing countries 
could resort to a differentiated imposition of im-
port and export duties and quantitative restric-
tions on products of interest to developed 
countries. Imports from and exports to developed 
countries granting easy access would accordingly 
be subject to lower duties and/or larger quotas 
than those originating from or destined to more 
restrictive developed countries. Import and ex-
port duties could thus consist of two different 
components: i) one fixed MFN (most favoured 
nation) component, which would be applied, as is 
traditionally the case, irrespective of the origin of 
the imports or the destination of the exports 
affected; and ii) one variable component, im-
posed on individual developed countries accord-
ing to how stringent their commercial policies 
were. The new strategy could further involve the 
use of counter-trade or package deals whereby 
sets of goods of export or import interest to de-
veloped countries would be bartered against sets 
of goods of export interest to developing coun-
tries. Developed countries would thereby feel en-
couraged to acquire large quantities of goods of 
export interest to developing countries so as to 
secure reciprocally natural resources from and 
sales to developing markets (Fiallo, 1978 and 
1971; for a similar proposal, see Schafaeddin, 
1984). 
The suggested two-component system 
would constitute a qualification of GATT'S MFN 
principle. Despite its non-MFN element, however, 
the system can be implemented in conformity 
with GATT rules. Article xix provides that, in the 
absence of adequate compensation, exporting 
countries affected by safeguard measures may be 
authorized to impose non-MFN restrictions 
against imports from the offending country. 
Non-MFN countervailing action may similarly be 
authorized in the light of Articles xxn and xxin, 
particularly in the case of Contracting Parties 
affected as a result of measures taken by other 
parties (Jackson, 1969; and U.S. Executive 
Branch, 1973). Moreover, the numerical major-
ity which developing countries hold within GATT 
unquestionably allows them to exercise the vot-
ing power provided for essentially by Article 
xxv. The voting power gives authority to the 
majority of Contracting Parties for an extremely 
wide range of action (Jackson, 1969, appendix to 
section 5.4). As regards export controls, these 
measures are not stipulated by the General 
Agreement as possible countervailing elements. 
An interpretation made in 1950 asserted that 
export restrictions are not to be resorted to for 
the purpose of obtaining the relaxation of an-
other Contracting Party's import restriction 
(GATT, 1950). But such an interpretation does not 
form part of the Agreement. It can be reviewed 
in the light of present circumstances, notably in 
the context of the powers conferred by Article 
xxv. In any event, developing countries could 
hardly be prevented from resorting to export 
restrictions when they are forced to impose upon 
themselves voluntary export restraints or orderly 
marketing arrangements as a means of avoiding 
the further protectionist action that would other-
wise be taken by their developed partners in 
GATT. 
The proposed strategy could best be adopted 
through consultations among developing 
countries aimed at ensuring adequate policy co-
ordination. Policy would need to be co-ordinated 
in such a way as to allow each developing country 
to determine and impose commercial policy mea-
sures, especially where variable components 
were involved, in accordance with its own con-
cerns and priorities. Thus, the co-ordination ex-
ercise need not entail a high degree of 
harmonization of the commercial policies of de-
veloping countries. In fact, access to the markets 
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of individual developing countries is of interest 
to developed partners irrespective of how re-
stricted the markets of other developing countries 
may be: countervailing measures may, there-
fore, diverge among developing countries, yet 
their effectiveness as instruments of persuasion 
will not be impaired thereby. In the case of con-
trols on export supplies, harmonization would 
certainly be necessary so as to avoid self-
defeating competitive bidding among develop-
ing countries. But such harmonization should 
not be expected to be as deep and sophisticated as 
that necessary for the successful operation of 
international producers' associations: the pur-
pose of the strategy would not be the apprecia-
tion and/or stabilization of international prices 
(which indeed requires production and sale 
arrangements and homogeneous pricing by all 
producers) but simply a differentiated access to 
natural resources. Hence the use of resource di-
plomacy in the context of the proposed strategy 
is likely to be effective even in cases where con-
certed pricing has not proved successful. 
The strategy could encourage in developed 
countries a policy environment of less readiness 
to yield to protectionist pressures from local 
groups. It would make governments of de-
veloped countries more inclined to formulate 
alternative policies such as those designed to 
facilitate the reallocation of factors of production 
away from inefficient industries facing import 
competition. The proposed strategy would 
further strengthen the bargaining weight of gov-
ernment branches and of private groups in de-
veloped countries which do not share the pro-
tectionist ideology and are instead interested in 
granting more liberal access to imports from de-
veloping countries. Such sectors include: mone-
tary authorities which are aware of the in-
flationary effects of protectionist measures; anti-
trust authorities and commissions on restrictive 
business practices, inasmuch as tariff barriers 
tend to reinforce unduly the dominant market 
position of local corporations; importers, retail-
ers and consumers interested in low-cost sup-
plies; and firms in developed countries which de-
pend upon export sales to and/or commodity 
supplies from developing countries, and which 
could be affected by the countervailing measures 
that these latter countries might take. What is 
more, the proposed strategy may induce pro-
tectionist groups in developed countries to re-
consider their positions and to search for alterna-
tive approaches to the solution of their problems. 
Likewise, the strategy would tend to provide the 
less protectionist States members of economic 
groupings of developed countries with the 
motivation necessary to defend their positions 
and to resist claims from other developed part-
ners in favour of restrictions on imports from de-
veloping countries. 
The aforementioned considerations should 
by no means be interpreted as suggesting that 
developing countries should attempt to exploit 
divergences of approach among governmental 
authorities or local private groups in developed 
countries. After all, authorities and groups with-
in developed countries normally tend to have 
common national interests, and it is thus legiti-
mate for them to adopt common stances, particu-
larly in foreign trade issues. It is, however, equal-
ly legitimate for them to differ as to priorities 
and/or in opinions on how to meet and accommo-
date common concerns. The proposed strategy 
would accordingly be useful, not for exploiting 
conflicts or divergences, but for fostering within 
developed countries the understanding that it is 
in their national interest to facilitate access to im-
ports from developing countries. Such a strategy 
would contribute to the mobilization in de-
veloped countries of non-protectionist forces in 
favour of imports from developing countries: 
forces which might otherwise either remain pas-
sive or tend to advocate market access in favour 
only of developed partners which do resort to 
game strategies. 
The proposed strategy could lead to a move 
in favour of imports from accessible countries 
even if these do not represent the most efficient 
and/or cheapest suppliers. The system might, 
accordingly, give rise to some diversion of trade 
towards less efficient sources. But the net impact 
of such diversion should not necessarily be nega-
tive. Firstly, restrictions could be imposed mainly 
on the least essential imports, thereby avoiding 
trade diversion in cases where domestic econom-
ic development and/or social welfare could be 
significantly jeopardized. Secondly, the strategy 
is intented to stimulate improved market access 
for exports from developing countries. The 
alternative may, therefore, be a lower level os 
purchasing power and hence a smaller volume of 
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imports rather than a better, cost-efficient alloca-
tion of purchases. Thirdly, the strategy would 
entail an incentive to domestic production of the 
goods of which imports are restricted. Variable 
components can, in fact, be used as a means of 
providing protection to domestic industries with-
out unnecessarily harming the interests of those 
developed partners which grant relatively easy 
access to exports from the developing country 
concerned. The burden of protection for the 
development of infant industries would thus be 
basically removed from the less restrictive de-
veloped partners. Finally, the system might con-
stitute a meaningful instrument to promote 
trade among developing countries. In fact, intra-
Third-World trade would be free from variable 
components and, therefore, imports from other 
developing countries would enjoy preferential 
access as against those originating in restrictive 
developed countries. 
The level of foreign exchange earnings of 
developing countries is not determined only by 
conditions of access to the markets of developed 
countries. Other factors also play a crucial role, 
and these include: the terms of trade and their 
evolution; the limitations of foreign exchange 
earnings which arise from monopolistic practices 
of transnational corporations, such as transfer 
pricing and territorial market allocations; the 
1. Negotiation of debt payments 
The establishment of an international commod-
ity currency and the adoption of a more per-
suasive strategy in the field of market access 
would strengthen the leverage of debtor de-
veloping countries in the renegotiation of their 
debt payments. Of relevance in this context is the 
possible establishment of a debtors' club, an idea 
which has been attracting some attention. The 
terms and conditions of the transfer of technolo-
gy to developing countries; the participation of 
these countries in world shipping; and the pro-
motion of economic co-operation among de-
veloping countries. The emphasis placed in this 
paper upon the need for a new negotiation 
strategy in the field of market access should by no 
means be construed as reflecting an un-
derestimation of the importance of the other de-
terminants of the level of foreign exchange earn-
ings. The emphasis is due rather to the fact that 
the strategy currently used by developing 
countries in the negotiation of market access has 
not been subject to any major revision since the 
1960s, when developing countries succeeded in 
securing international support conducive to the 
incorporation of Part iv into the General Agree-
ment and to the establishment of the General 
System of Preferences. The present circum-
stances, in particular protectionism and sluggish 
world demand, are substantially different from 
those prevailing in the 1960s, and the revision of 
the strategy has become an imperative and ur-
gent need. Moreover, liberal market access is in 
consonance with the free market philosophy that 
major developed countries invoke and, there-
fore, negotiations in this field are likely to have 
particularly good changes of success provided 
that they are carried out with an effectively per-
suasive strategy. 
club would seem to be intended to strengthen the 
position of debtor developing countries in their 
effort to obtain from lenders better terms and 
conditions of payment. The club's power would 
lie in the possibility of resorting to the threat of a 
joint repudiation of its members' foreign debt. 
Action along such lines, however, would not be 
exempt from adverse boomerang effects. A joint 
debt repudiation would no doubt shake the bases 
of the world financial system. But, at the same 
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time, the doors of the international capital mar-
kets would be shut for the debt-repudiating 
countries. 
A debtors' club would, however, become a 
viable project in the context of the proposed two-
front attack. In this case, the card that the club 
could play in the bargaining game would relate 
not to debt repudiation but rather to making 
debt payments conditional on the creditors' 
acceptance of the international currency as well 
as on liberal access to the creditors' import mar-
kets. Agreements could be reached between debt-
ors and creditors whereby: i) a proportion of 
the foreign debt would be paid in the in-
ternational commodity currency; and ii) the size 
of debt payments would be made dependent 
upon the level of the debtors' exports to the cred-
itor countries. The iMF'sconditionality upon 
adjustment policies would thus be matched by a 
debtors' conditionality upon currency accept-
ance and upon market access. Negotiations on 
these matters could best be conducted in a multi-
lateral framework and would be complementary 
to the traditional bilateral dealings of debtor 
countries with their respective partners. 
It would be difficult to conceive of major 
countries refusing to accept payments in an in-
ternational currency managed by such an ortho-
dox institution as the IMF. Lenders could even 
The payments crisis of the developing countries 
has attained dramatic proportions and cannot be 
overcome without major action upon the two key 
determinants of payments capacity, namely, the 
capacity to hold or create liquid assets and the 
capacity to generate foreign exchange, notably 
through earnings from external trade. The ac-
tion proposed in this paper relates to the es-
tablishment of an international commodity cur-
rency which could be managed by the IMF, and to 
the adoption by developing countries of a more 
persuasive strategy in market access negotia-
tions. The proposed action would require de-
veloping countries to play an active role, notably 
become active supporters of the new currency 
inasmuch as its establishment would facilitate the 
reimbursement of their loans. As regards the 
linking of debt payments with the level of the 
debtor's exports, this type of trade-off has 
already been used by a few pioneers among the 
debtor developing countries, and would become 
more effective if resorted to jointly by a group of 
such countries. 
2. Implementation of adjustment programmes 
The adoption of the two-front initiative would 
considerably enhance the ability of debtor de-
veloping countries to effect their debt payments 
without having to submit their domestic econo-
mies to unduly over-deflationary policies. An in-
crease in foreign exchange earnings as a result of 
better market access would narrow the balance-
of-payments deficit and, therefore, would re-
duce the magnitude of the adjustment which the 
national economy required. As regards liquidity, 
it is certainly a separate and different dimension, 
and does not constitute an alternative to 
adjustment.2 But an increase in liquidity could 
complement adjustment programmes and could 
thus alleviate the burden of the austerity which 
such programmes normally embody. 
by committing their own natural resources and 
import markets and by manipulating them as 
negotiating cards. The payments problems of the 
developing countries are indeed too acute to be 
resolved by mere pledges of international co-
operation or by the adoption of global agendas 
which will not per se improve the bargaining 
leverage of developing countries. The two-front 
initiative would further strengthen the leverage 
of developing countries in the negotiation of the 
terms and conditions of debt repayment and 
2The difference between liquidity and adjustment is 
explained in detail by Mundell (1971). 
V 
Conclusion 
A TWO-FRONT ATTACK ON THE PAYMENTS CRISIS / Faino R, Fiallo 95 
would serve to alleviate considerably the burden 
of the adjustment programmes which develop-
ing countries need to implement. 
The proposed action would constitute a 
breakthrough in international economic rela-
tions and would represent a major departure 
from prevailing conventional wisdom. Wisdom 
today indeed avers that developing countries do 
not have the resources and the power to partici-
pate actively in international bargaining, and 
that their role should thus be limited essentially 
to attempting to convince other partners by 
means of debate exercises. A story of the blinding 
effects of conventional wisdom appears to be use-
ful in this context. It relates to the rational ex-
pectations theory, which, to put it roughly, 
asserts inter alia that an individual can hardly take 
advantage by himself of his own expectations on 
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